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Abstract 
This paper points out that education should be the central objective of the 
post-2010 Lisbon Process. Compared to other OECD countries, the member 
states of the European Union perform poorly when it comes to key indicators 
of innovative potential, such as the percentage of students enrolled in tertiary 
education and the educational quality of Europe’s students. Education makes a 
three-fold contribution to a country’s economic health. First it is beneficial for 
employment rates, second it is a key driver for long-term economic growth 
and third it appears to be beneficial for social cohesion. It will be crucial for 
European countries to attain higher levels of tertiary education and increase 
the quality of their education.     
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THE POST-2010 LISBON PROCESS 
THE KEY ROLE OF EDUCATION 
IN EMPLOYMENT AND COMPETITIVENESS 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 308/DECEMBER 2008 
DANIEL GROS AND FELIX ROTH
 * 
Lisbon has been neither a complete success story nor a complete failure. It is now important for 
the EU to look ahead and to realise it is facing new challenges that could not have been foreseen 
in 2000.
1 A post-2010 Lisbon strategy ought to focus on ‘competitiveness through innovation’. 
But how best to foster innovation? This contribution argues that innovation can best be achieved 
by additional investment in human capital, a dimension that has not been given enough attention 
in the original Lisbon strategy of 2000. 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Looking  back 
With only two more years to go, the ambitious goal to make the EU the most competitive 
economy by 2010 will certainly be missed, as will also the three main Lisbon goals 
(employment, growth and social cohesion. Considerable progress has been made mainly on the 
employment front, with the overall employment rate in the EU increasing by over 4 percentage 
points, but at around 67% in 2007 in the EU15 (and 65.4% in the EU27), it remains well below 
the goal of 70%. And with the business cycle turning down, it is questionable that further 
progress can be made until 2010. On growth, the performance has fallen even further from the 
goalpost (3%), with only two countries from the EU15, Greece and Ireland, recording consistent 
growth rates of over 3% over the period 2000-2007 (and Ireland is now in recession). However, 
the Lisbon growth target might simply have been too ambitious. Over the last decade, the 
growth record of the EU has been, on a per capita basis, almost exactly the same as that of the 
US. Hence there has been no catching-up with respect to the US, but also no sliding back. On 
social cohesion there has been no progress, income inequality has stayed constant. 
1.2 Looking  forward 
A new Lisbon process (2010-2020) will have to be designed with a completely different 
background. In 2000 the EU had only 15 members, the US seemed to have the strongest 
economy in world, climate change was not the priority it is today and financial markets were 
seen as growth factor. However, these assumptions are no longer appropriate for the next 
decade. Financial markets have now become a risk factor, threatening growth and requiring 
extensive government support. Combating climate change has become a priority for the EU. 
These two factors, reform of financial markets and the post-Kyoto regime for limiting CO2 
emissions, will certainly have to be part of the next Lisbon strategy. It is also apparent that the 
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next Lisbon strategy will have to be valid for all 27+ member states, including the goal of 
reducing the still-substantial disparities in income per capita between old and new member 
states. Considerable progress in convergence has already been achieved and our analysis, which 
stresses the importance of investment in human capital, suggests that progress on this front 
should continue given the generally high level of the human capital in the new member states. 
However, the key change to keep in mind when drafting the next Lisbon strategy is that the 
global challenge to the EU is more likely to come from emerging economies like China, rather 
than the US. China will soon overtake the US as the biggest exporter (not counting the EU). 
Moreover, the structure of the Chinese economy is changing rapidly. Its exports are becoming 
increasingly intensive in technology and capital. Given its extremely high domestic savings rate, 
China can finance an unprecedented investment boom which is increasing the capital available 
for each worker at a more rapid pace than even in Korea or Japan during the phase of quickest 
growth of these economies. It is thus likely that by the end of the next decade the amount of 
capital available per worker will be higher in China than in the EU. 
Thus, one question seems to be crucial: On what basis could Europe maintain a comparative 
advantage vis-à-vis very large emerging economies like China? Once China has accumulated as 
much capital as the EU, the answer must to be investment in human capital, i.e. education. The 
answer is straightforward and pragmatic.  
The focus on educational policies has one more rationale: All other policies that might foster 
employment or growth are likely to have negative ‘side effects’ on other Lisbon goals. For 
example, labour market reforms might increase employment in the long run, but they often have 
a negative impact on social cohesion. By contrast educational policies that strengthen the 
quantity and quality of education, thus leading to higher skill levels, will have positive side 
effects. One can expect not only more growth, but also higher employment rates and less 
inequality (although an excessively cohesive society might hamper economic growth). 
2.  Where do we stand? Education and skills in the EU27 
Education figured already among the original Lisbon goals, but this area never became a 
priority. It is clear that little can be done to change the skill level of an entire work force over 
night. Most of the training one receives in life comes at an early stage. Experience has shown 
that ‘continuing education’ is a worthwhile goal, but in reality even the best continuing 
education programmes can help advance only the few that really desire to learn more after they 
have already started working.  
Hence we propose to concentrate on the youngest cohort of the workforce; those still in 
education because their performance determines the composition of the workforce in the future. 
The highly skilled workers and scientists that the ‘knowledge economy’ needs during the next 
decade are being formed right now.  
We propose to concentrate on a composite indicator which relies on measurement of both the 
quantity and quality of the investment in education. The first element, quantity, is defined as: i) 
the percentage of people aged 25-34 who have attained upper-secondary education and ii) the 
percentage of people aged 25-34 who have attained tertiary education. The first is important 
when it comes to medium technology-intensive manufacturing in general. The second quantity 
indicator is a useful predictor of the potential for innovation. Highly developed countries, the 
OECD countries and the member states of the EU depend on high proportions of people with 
university degrees, especially degrees in the natural sciences, engineering and medicine, to be 
able to dominate global markets with new patenting activity and innovative production 
processes.  THE POST-2010 LISBON-PROCESS | 3 
 
Although these two quantitative indicators tell us something about the stocks of human capital, 
they do not tell us about the quality of the skills and knowledge of the workforce. It might be, 
for example, that in some nations a high proportion of the population has attained upper-
secondary education but the quality of the education is overall poor. Thus the nation’s labour 
force might not be capable of enhancing productivity, but could more likely represent a burden. 
Thus it is crucial to also focus on the quality of education. 
We measure the quality of education by looking at the performance of students in a variety of 
fields. For a numerical measure we use the results from the PISA tests of the OECD which 
provide reliable and internationally comparable indicators of the skills of students in upper 
secondary education in mathematics, sciences and reading. 
In Figure 1 we put these two aspects together in a single composite indicator (which shows the 
combined effect of the population’s (aged 25-34) attainment of upper-secondary education with 
PISA test results to measure the human capital useful for ‘normal’ manufacturing and service 
activities. Figure 1 shows that the global ranking is led by the non-European country Korea, 
followed by the best-performing European country Finland. Canada is positioned in third place 
before the three transition countries Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia and Sweden. 
Germany is positioned in an upper-middle position, whereas France and the United Kingdom 
are located at the lower end of the distribution. The US is located in the lower middle part of the 
distribution. The Mediterranean countries Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece are located on four 
of the five last ranks.  
Figure 1. Upper-secondary education attainment and PISA test results in 2006 
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This picture changes however when one looks at the type of composite indicator for the 
innovative potential (combining Pisa results with the indicator on tertiary education attainment 
rate) in Figure 2.  
It is striking to observe that two relatively advanced countries like Germany and Austria range 
at the end of the EU27 distribution just before the two Mediterranean countries Italy and 
Portugal as well as the three transition countries Slovakia, Hungary and Czech Republic. The 
three leading countries Canada, Japan and Korea are all non-European and significantly 
dominate the ranking. The best-performing European country Finland is respectively located in 
the fourth position, followed by Ireland and the Netherlands. On average the EU does not seem 
to have a strong starting position in the race for innovation, at least in terms of the quantity and 
quality of its human capital.  
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Figure 2. Tertiary education attainment and PISA test results in 2006 
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The same conclusion arises if one looks only at the distribution of the G7 countries in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Tertiary education attainment and PISA test results in 2006 in the G7 
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Canada and Japan clearly lead the ranking before the United States, France and the United 
Kingdom which are positioned in the middle. Germany and Italy are performing poorly in 
comparison to the rest of the countries. This is especially problematic for Germany, which is 
still heavily reliant on its manufacturing industries, but is not preparing to foster its research and 
innovative capacities, as the stocks of tertiary attainment remain low and the quality of 
education is average. Furthermore, Germany is the only country where the population aged 55-
64 has attained a higher percentage of tertiary education (23%) in comparison to the youngest 
cohort (22%). In most other countries there had been huge increases over the time. Although in 
the US there has been only a slight increase of 1%, the tertiary graduation rate is nearly double 
the amount of that of Germany. THE POST-2010 LISBON-PROCESS | 5 
 
3.  Education and employment in the EU27 
But how is education related to employment and competitiveness? The most visible Lisbon 
target, and in principle the one most susceptible to be influenced by policy, remains the goal to 
reach an employment rate of 70% (by the year 2010). The implicit benchmark for the EU in 
setting the goal of an employment rate of 70% in 2000 was the US, which had attained this 
value at that time. Over the last years the employment rate has increased in the EU15 from 
around 62% to close to 67%. However progress has been too slow to put the Lisbon target 
within reach by the end of the decade. Another 8 millions jobs would have to be created to reach 
the goal. But how can the employment rate of 70% be achieved? 
The official mantra is that reforms, especially labour market reforms, are needed to reach this 
goal. It is true that the employment rate in Europe is low because some groups participate only 
weakly in the labour market, but it is not widely appreciated that the EU15 has actually a 
slightly better (or rather less bad) record than the US in providing jobs for the less skilled.  
Table 1. Education and employment – Comparison of EU15 and US (2004) 
  Share of population*   Employment rates 
 EU15  US    EU15  US 
Below upper secondary  37.8  21.3  50.6  43 
Upper secondary  41.5  52.3  70  71.1 
Tertiary 20.7  26.5  82.6  82.9 
* Aged 15-64. 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD and Eurostat data.  
As a matter of fact, Table 1 highlights that the employment rate for those with less than upper 
secondary skill levels is higher in the EU (50.6%) than in the US (43%). The problem of the EU 
is thus not mainly that the lower skilled cannot not find a job in a rigid labour market, but rather 
that there are far too many of the low skilled around since the EU over one-third (37.8% of the 
population in working age) has not even completed upper secondary education against around 
one-fifth (21.3 %) in the US. 
US employment rates are only marginally higher than those in the EU among the higher skilled. 
The big difference here is the fact that in the US the proportion of the working age population 
with higher skills is about a quarter higher than in Europe: 26% of the US population has 
tertiary education compared to around 21% for the EU.
2 
3.1  Progress so far 
Given the large differences in the employment ratios at different skill levels documented so far, 
it is clear that the evolution of the overall employment ratio will depend not only on labour 
market reforms, but also on changes in the skill composition of the potential work force. An 
increase in the share of the higher skilled should lead to a higher employment rate even in the 
absence of reforms simply because the higher skilled tend to have a higher employment rate. 
Table 2 below provides the relevant data for the eight-year period 1999-2007. The last row 
                                                      
2 International comparisons of skill levels are inherently difficult because of differences in national 
education systems. Different sources give somewhat different numbers, but the broad picture is the same 
across all sources: employment rates are very similar on both sides of the Atlantic within most skill 
categories, but the skill composition of the population is quite different, with a much higher proportion of 
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gives the overall employment ratio for the EU15 in 1999 and 2007. This overall ratio has 
increased from 62.2 to 67, and thus by a significant amount over these eight years. However, 
looking at the employment rates by skill levels give a different picture: for the lowest of the 
three skill levels considered here the employment rate increased insignificantly by 0.9%. The 
conclusion is clear: the overall employment ratio has increased in the EU mainly because the 
share of the lower skills has declined over this period. Labour market reforms inspired by the 
Lisbon agenda have had a marginal impact at best. 
Table 2. Education and employment: What has improved since Lisbon in the EU15? 
  Share of population*   Employment rates 
 1999  2007    Change  1999  2007  Change 
Below upper secondary  41.7  35.4  -6.3  51 51.9  +0.9 
Upper secondary  40  42.3  +2.3  68.7 72.3 +3.6 
Tertiary 18.3    22.3  +4.0  81.8 83.9 +2.1 
Overall NA  NA  NA  62.2  67  +4.8 
* Aged 15-64. 
Source: Own calculations based on Eurostat data.  
3.2  What would a ‘better educated’ Europe look like? 
A simple thought experiment can illustrate the importance of raising the skill level for the 
comparison EU-US: assuming that there are no reforms in EU labour markets one can assume 
that the employment rates by skills should remain roughly constant, even if the skill 
composition of the population changes. One can then ask what would be the EU employment 
ratio if the EU population had, on average, the same composition in terms of qualification levels 
as that of the US. The answer is simple: the employment rate in the EU should be roughly equal 
to that of the US (and rather close to 70%).  
This simple result derives from the fact that the employment rates in different skill groups are 
quite similar in the EU(15) and the US. As already mentioned above, the employment rate for 
those with less than upper secondary education is actually somewhat higher in the EU. But the 
difference is rather small and this is also the case for other skill levels.  
Table 3 below shows the present shares of the population in the EU at different skill levels as 
well as the Lisbon benchmark in rounded numbers. 
Table 3. Education and employment: A thought experiment based on stylised facts 
  Share of population* (rounded)  Typical employment rates (rounded) 
  EU-15   Benchmark  EU-15 = US 
Belowupper secondary  35  15  50 
Upper secondary  45  55  70  
Tertiary  20   30  80  
* Aged 15-64. 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD data.  
The key challenges are at the lowest and the highest level: In the EU around 35 % of the 
population does not have upper secondary education, whereas the Lisbon target (of course 
initially only for the youths) is less than half of this, i.e. 15 %. Part of the mirror image of this is THE POST-2010 LISBON-PROCESS | 7 
 
that around 30% of the population should have a tertiary (University) education, against only 
20% at present.  
As for the employment rates by skill class, there is no particular benchmark so that this example 
uses the actual numbers which are very quite similar on both sides of the Atlantic: around 50% 
for the lowest skill class, compared to around (mostly above) 80% for the highest skill class 
(those with University degrees). With its present skill composition the EU has an employment 
rate of around 67% (Figure 4 illustrates the employment rate in more detail with respect to 
levels of education in EU15). However, if the EU improved the skill level of its population to its 
own benchmark (which has already been reached in some Scandinavian countries) the 
employment rate should go to 70%.  
Figure 4. Employment rate with respect to levels of education in EU15 
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The basic mechanism is quite simple: increasing the share of the population with a least upper 
secondary education by 10 percentage point (and reducing that of the level below) yields a gain 
of 2 percentage points in terms of the overall employment ratio because the employment rate of 
those with upper secondary education is 20 points higher than those with below upper 
secondary (70% versus roughly 50%). Increasing the share of those with tertiary education also 
by 10% leads to a further gain of around 3 percentage points because the employment rate of 
this skill level is 30 points higher than those with below upper secondary.
3 
                                                      
3 How realistic is it to expect that employment rates would stay high for people with tertiary education if 
their supply increases massively? The experience of most EU member countries actually suggests that 
there is no negative correlation at all between an increased supply of workers with higher education and 
their employment rates. Those countries that have seen over the last decade the strongest increase in the 
supply of people with tertiary education have also experiences the highest increase in their employment 
rates. Overall, the cross-country correlation between the change in the share of the population with 
tertiary education and the change in their employment rates has been strongly positive, suggesting that 
improving the education level does not lead to unemployed academics. 8 | GROS & ROTH 
 
4.  Education and growth 
The overall level of education and more precisely the skills, abilities and creativity of European 
citizens constitute also a key determinant for European growth. 
There is no need here to prove the link between education and growth.
4 As an illustration, 
Figure 5 shows the link between education (measured here by average years of schooling) and 
growth for the 1990-2004 period (after controlling for other important variables like investment 
and the initial income per capita). The positive link between educational levels and economic 
growth is apparent. 
Figure 5. Human capital and economic growth: Partial regression plot for 23 OECD countries  
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5.  Educational levels and levels of social cohesion 
Although educational levels do not seem to be the main driving force in explaining levels of 
interpersonal trust in an OECD country sample (see Roth, 2008) in certain model specifications 
they still seem to be strongly associated with levels of interpersonal trust. The scatter plot in 
                                                      
4 Although some studies question the significant positive relationship between human capital and 
economic growth (Pritchett, 2001) a majority of the empirical results support a positive relationship 
between levels of education and economic growth (Barro, 1991; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Krueger & 
Lindhal, 2001; Bassanini & Scarpetta, 2001). Recent research argues e.g. that findings of non positive 
relationships between education and economic growth are mostly due to poor data quality (De la Fuente 
et al., 2000), thus when utilizing high quality data a robust positive relationship between education and 
growth can be established. The positive relationship can not only be replicated when using quantitative 
data like average years of schooling, but also when using qualitative data from the PISA tests (Hanushek 
et al., 2007). THE POST-2010 LISBON-PROCESS | 9 
 
Figure 6 between education and levels of interpersonal trust, which can be regarded as a very 
good proxy of social cohesion, shows a fascinating pattern. Those countries with low levels of 
education have low levels of interpersonal trust. In the lower left corner there those countries 
with low levels of education like for instance Portugal and low levels of trust. In the upper right 
corner are the Scandinavian countries with high levels of human capital and high levels of trust. 
In the middle are the coordinated countries.   
Figure 6. Scatter plot between education and interpersonal trust for 20 OECD countries 
 
 
6.  Better performance of education? 
But how are we going to achieve a better performance in education? Do we have to invest more 
money in the education system? Taking PISA data and plotting them against the total 
educational expenditure costs of GDP (Figure 7) shows that there is no relationship between 
educational expenditure and the PISA results. Portugal for instance spends a relative high 
amount on education but has very low results in the PISA test. The correlation between these 
two variables (as measured by the R2) is only 0.3, implying that the amount of resources (public 
plus private) that a country spends on education is not a key factor in determining the 
educational achievements of its high school students. 10 | GROS & ROTH 
 
Figure 7. Total expenditure on education and student achievement 
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If the quantity of spending on education is not decisive in determining educational 
achievements, one should perhaps look at the quality. Quality in this context should mean the 
efficiency of the given spending on education. The efficiency of a government is or course 
difficult to measure objectively. However, there exist numerical indicators resulting from 
extensive survey work done by international institutions. The indicator used here comes from 
the World Bank and is called ‘government effectiveness’ – see Kaufmann et al. (2005) for more 
details.
5 Using this indicator one finds immediately a rather strong result: there is a very strong 
correlation between government efficiency and education achievement (Figure 8). 
Increasing the government efficiency seems to be crucial in increasing the quality of the 
education. The basic message from the data is that one key parameter that distinguished member 
countries is the efficiency of their governments. This implies that one cannot just copy 
educational programs from one country to another. A program that might work in a highly 
efficient country (e.g. one of the Nordics), might in reality work quite differently in another 
country with a lower degree of efficiency in its public administration and the same program 
might thus not give the same results. 
 
                                                      
5 Kaufmann et al. (2005) define government effectiveness by combining the responses on the quality of 
public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the 
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to policies. The main focus of this index is on ‘inputs’ required for the government to be 
able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods.” THE POST-2010 LISBON-PROCESS | 11 
 
Figure 8. Government effectiveness and student achievement 
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7. Conclusion 
There can be little doubt that education should be the central objective of the next Lisbon 
strategy. The EU does not seem to be well equipped on this account if one only looks at the key 
indicators of innovative potential, at least if compared to the rest of the OECD countries. 
Moreover the quantity and quality of human capital vary substantially in the European Union. 
The Mediterranean countries in particular seem to face severe problems. 
It is also clear that education plays a key role in increasing the employment rate in the European 
Union. Labour market reforms have a role to play, but further investment in human capital is 
more important. 
Finally, education plays a key role in explaining long-term economic growth. Countries with 
higher stocks and quality of education are growing faster and are more competitive. Those 
countries will more easily tackle the challenges of the process of globalization and will be better 
prepared with respect to the three emerging countries of China, India and Brazil. 
To sum up, it will be crucial for European countries to attain higher levels of tertiary education, 
especially in the fields of natural sciences, mathematics and engineering. European countries 
should also try to increase the quality of their education. In contrast to the 2000 Lisbon strategy, 
the post-2010 Lisbon process should put educational policies in first place. 
 12 | 
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and	maintain	unqualified	independence.
•	 To	provide	a	forum	for	discussion	among	all	
stakeholders	in	the	European	policy	process.
•	 To	build	collaborative	networks	of	researchers,	
policy-makers	and	business	representatives	across	
the	whole	of	Europe.
•	 To	disseminate	our	findings	and	views	through	a	
regular	flow	of	publications	and	public	events.
Assets
•	 Complete	independence	to	set	its	own	research	
priorities	and	freedom	from	any	outside	influence.
•	 Formation	of	nine	different	research	networks,	
comprising	research	institutes	from	throughout	
Europe	and	beyond,	to	complement	and	
consolidate	CEPS	research	expertise	and	to	greatly	
extend	its	outreach.
•	 An	extensive	membership	base	of	some	120	
Corporate	Members	and	130	Institutional	
Members,	which	provide	expertise	and	practical	
experience	and	act	as	a	sounding	board	for	the	
utility	and	feasability	of	CEPS	policy	proposals.
Programme Structure
CEPS	carries	out	its	research	via	its	own	in-house	
research	programmes	and	through	collaborative	
research	networks	involving	the	active	participation	of	
other	highly	reputable	institutes	and	specialists.
Research	Programmes
Economic	&	Social	Welfare	Policies
Energy,	Climate	Change	&	Sustainable	Development
EU	Neighbourhood,	Foreign	&	Security	Policy
Financial	Markets	&	Taxation
Justice	&	Home	Affairs
Politics	&	European	Institutions
Regulatory	Affairs
Trade,	Development	&	Agricultural	Policy
Research	Networks/Joint	Initiatives
Changing	Landscape	of	Security	&	Liberty	(CHALLENGE)
European	Capital	Markets	Institute	(ECMI)
European	Climate	Platform	(ECP)
European	Credit	Research	Institute	(ECRI)
European	Network	of	Agricultural	&	Rural	Policy	Research	
Institutes	(ENARPRI)
European	Network	for	Better	Regulation	(ENBR)
European	Network	of	Economic	Policy	Research	Institutes	
(ENEPRI)
European	Policy	Institutes	Network	(EPIN)
European	Security	Forum	(ESF)
CEPS	also	organises	a	variety	of	activities	and	special	
events,	involving	its	members	and	other	stakeholders	
in	the	European	policy	debate,	national	and	EU-level	
policy-makers,	academics,	corporate	executives,	NGOs	
and	the	media.	CEPS’	funding	is	obtained	from	a	
variety	of	sources,	including	membership	fees,	project	
research,	foundation	grants,	conferences	fees,	publi-
cation	sales	and	an	annual	grant	from	the	European	
Commission.